Ahmed al-Sharaa’s first year in power bodes ill for Syria’s future

Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former Islamist commander linked to al-Qaeda factions, toppled Syria’s long-time dictator Bashar al-Assad on December 8, 2024. For a fleeting moment, Syrians flooded the streets in jubilation, believing decades of tyranny, censorship, and religious repression had finally ended. But the celebration was short-lived. Within weeks, the revolution’s promise of justice and freedom curdled into fear. The prisons reopened under new names, dissent vanished again, and the economy, already shattered by years of war and sanctions, continued to collapse. A year later, Syria remains a nation suffocating under renewed authoritarianism, caught between the ghosts of the old regime and the brutal certainty of the new.

In the early months after Assad’s fall, all eyes were on the man labelled a terrorist, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, who had rebranded himself as President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The United States and its allies hailed the end of Assad’s rule, a day they had been eagerly anticipating. They also embraced the new government, one they expected to align with their interests. There is no doubt that Assad ruled as a dictator, and for decades, Syrians suffered deeply under his regime, none more so than the Kurds. However, one year into al-Sharaa’s presidency, it is clear that if he is not worse than Assad, he is at least no better. Washington and its partners continue to overlook his repression, embracing him as a necessary actor in a fractured region.

Who was Abu Mohammed al-Julani?

Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Julani, was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in 1982, and returned with his family to his home country, Syria, in 1989. Al-Sharaa passed through several jihadist groups after moving to Iraq in 2003 to join al-Qaeda in the fight against US forces, later joining al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which became the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2006.

On May 14, 2005, he was detained by US forces and held for five years at Camp Bucca, where he met militant collaborators. During his imprisonment, he wrote a 50‑page booklet outlining strategies to topple the Assad regime, where, ironically, his father’s cousin Farouk al-Sharaa served as vice president from 2006 to 2014, unaware of young al-Sharaa’s whereabouts. In 2011, al-Julani coordinated with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, head of al-Qaeda’s Islamic State of Iraq (which later became ISIS/ISIL), and was tasked with establishing al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria, the al-Nusra Front, which became influential in opposition-held areas, especially Idlib, during the war.

In 2017, he formed Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) when several Islamist factions merged in northwestern Syria. By 2019, Human Rights Watch documented that HTS had arbitrarily arrested residents in Idlib, Hama, and Aleppo and funded its activities through local taxes and tariffs. For nearly eight years, HTS governed Idlib and other areas, committing countless crimes, and at the end of 2024, the group had seized full control of Syria, overthrowing Bashar al-Assad on December 8 and ending more than half a century of al-Assad family rule, setting the stage for al-Julani to declare himself president.

The statesman, Ahmed al-Sharaa

The fall of al-Assad was not the only shocking event in Syria in 2024. Equally striking was the transformation of al-Julani into Ahmed al-Sharaa, a change from “terrorist militant” to statesman. Shedding his battle attire and turban for a suit and tie, al-Sharaa presented himself as a champion of effective governance and unity. At the same time, his alliances shifted with startling speed. Once a loyal ally of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, he sought favour with Donald Trump and the US, signalling a new chapter in Syria’s foreign relations. The US, which had once placed a $10 million bounty on al-Sharaa’s head, quietly removed it after he seized power and adopted a friendlier posture toward his regime. Yet for those who remember the darkest years of HTS rule, his transformation inspired not confidence, but dread.

Al-Sharaa declared himself interim president on January 29, 2025, outlining a plan to re-establish the Syrian state. He spoke of inclusive and transparent governance and a popular process to shape the new constitution. On other occasions, Al-Sharra also addressed minority concerns: “Christians are an essential part of the fabric of Syrian society,” he said, promising that “there will be no more injustices against the Kurdish people.” He assured visiting Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt that Syria would not exclude any religious group.

Abdul Hamid al-Awak, a member of the committee that drafted the transitional declaration, said the plan guarantees freedom of opinion, expression, and the press. He also emphasized that women’s rights and judicial independence are protected under the new framework.

However, the reality on the ground tells a very different story. HTS’s ideology is exclusionary, tolerating no one outside its own ranks. The group has shown open hostility toward minorities, particularly Kurds, and even banned Christmas celebrations during the 2025 New Year. It has also continued to target and persecute members of the Alawite community.

Between late February and early March 2025, a wave of attacks targeted the Alawite minority. Human Rights Watch reported that government forces, including defence and interior ministry units, allied militias, and armed volunteers, swept through Alawite-majority towns and villages in Tartous, Latakia, and Hama, leaving behind torched homes, mass graves, and shattered communities. Killings, disappearances, and arbitrary detentions became routine. By June 2025, Reuters confirmed that roughly 1,500 Alawites had been killed across 40 sites during the violence.

On March 13, 2025, al-Sharaa changed the constitution and granted himself sweeping powers over Syria’s judiciary and legislature, eliminating any form of oversight. Like many leaders consolidating power, he moved quickly to seize control of the courts, the law, and parliament. Article 47 gives the president sole authority to appoint all seven members of the Higher Constitutional Court without parliamentary input, effectively erasing judicial independence. Article 24 goes further, allowing him to handpick one-third of the transitional parliament and appoint the committee that selects the rest.

This concentration of power has left the rule of law hollow. Despite having been promised equality, Kurds and other minorities are excluded from decision-making and court representation. Even among Sunni Muslims, only those ideologically aligned and personally loyal to al-Sharaa hold influence. The legal system now serves not justice, but obedience—a warning of how quickly the revolution’s promises gave way to a new, more insidious authoritarianism.

On June 22, 2025, a suicide bombing at the Greek Orthodox Mar Elias Church in Dweil’a, on the outskirts of Damascus, killed at least 22 people and wounded 63. In July 2025, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that violence in al-Suwayda had claimed 1,265 lives, including 609 Druze civilians. Thousands more were displaced.

In October 2025, forces affiliated with the Syrian government attacked Kurdish-majority neighbourhoods in northern Aleppo province, escalating tensions and prompting residents to describe the assault as a “siege.” At the same time, Damascus did not recognize Kurdish Newroz as an official national holiday in Syria.

One year of al-Sharaa: What is going on?

A year after Ahmed al-Sharaa’s rise, his government insisted that the rights of Syria’s minorities remained intact. Yet the reality on the ground points in the opposite direction. The country is politically fractured, economically stagnant, and socially adrift, while minorities, Kurds, Druze, Alawites, and Christians face growing exclusion, insecurity, and targeted violence. Al-Sharaa has removed these communities from senior posts in the security services, military leadership, and intelligence bodies, leaving them with virtually no influence over major state decisions. Sectarian tensions have sharpened as a result, and Syria again risks fragmentation; the Druze religious leadership’s declaration of independence from Damascus is only the clearest signal of this unravelling.

This deterioration reflects more than political missteps; it stems from the ideological background that shaped al-Sharaa himself. His ascent from hard-line, exclusionary currents has translated into a governing style that rejects pluralism, tolerates no competing identities, and treats power-sharing as weakness. Whether such movements operate from remote hideouts or presidential palaces, their absolutist worldview remains the same. Under al-Sharaa, that worldview has now been projected onto the state, deepening divisions and accelerating Syria’s slide into renewed sectarian fracture.

Al-Sharaa’s promised economic recovery has largely failed to materialize. In early 2025, Syria’s economy continued to struggle under lingering Western sanctions, and ordinary Syrians saw little improvement in living conditions. By March, the UN reported that 90 percent of the population remained in poverty, an indication that the new leadership had yet to deliver tangible benefits. While inflation, which had soared during the war, began to ease slightly thanks to a stabilizing currency and increased availability of goods, overall economic hardship persists.

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Ongoing sanctions and conflict have weakened Syria’s economy, causing declines in tourism, energy, and manufacturing, while the illicit trade in substances like Captagon, a synthetic amphetamine-type stimulant, has continued. These financial strains are fuelling social tensions and eroding trust in the government, raising the risk of deeper instability and growing reliance on illicit economies if conditions persist.

During al-Sharaa’s first year in power, Syria’s sovereignty has eroded as he prioritizes staying in power. Turkey has expanded its influence by backing militias to limit Kurdish autonomy, while Israel controls parts of the country and intervenes in minority affairs, leaving al-Sharaa largely following external directives. Meanwhile, the US and its allies maintain overarching influence, leaving the government with little real power.

Internally, minorities remain distrustful of him, while militias now wield more power than the government. Foreign fighters in HTS and other armed groups operate with impunity, raiding homes, kidnapping, torturing, and killing anyone they target or oppose, but the police and security forces are largely powerless.

The most alarming aspect, both internationally and locally, is how foreign powers have shaped Syria’s trajectory. Even as the US and its allies largely turned a blind eye to developments under al-Sharaa, figures like David Petraeus and Donald Trump publicly praised him, reflecting a longstanding pattern: the US has historically supported dictators, extremists, and militant leaders to counter perceived enemies, only for some of these “monsters” to return and destabilize the region.

The US opposition to Assad was never primarily about his dictatorship or brutality, but about his alignment with Russia and Iran. Now, under al-Sharaa, foreign influence has grown even stronger. The longer al-Sharaa remains in power, the greater the danger for Syria. His rule risks producing yet another figure shaped and tolerated by foreign powers, reminiscent of Saddam Hussein or, in a different way, foreign-backed militant leaders such as Osama bin Laden.

Diary Marif is a Vancouver-based Kurdish writer and freelance journalist born in Iraq. He holds a master’s degree in history from Pune University in India (2013). His journalism has appeared in national and international outlets, with a focus on newcomers, minorities, and marginalized communities. Since 2018, Marif has centred his creative work on memoir and personal narrative, exploring his experiences as a child of war. He also advocates for oppressed peoples, including Palestinians, Kurds, and Druze. He received an Honourable Mention for the 2022 Susan Crean Award for Nonfiction, is a 2025 recipient of the Yosef Wosk Vancouver Manuscript Intensive Fellowship, and was awarded PEN Canada’s 2025 Marie-Ange Garrigue Prize.